The objective of this paper is to study how to extract information from equilibrium trading volume (dened here as the sum of buy orders) under very general assumptions, so that the propositions developed in the paper can apply to a broad class of models. The only assumptions are that the random variable about which one wants to extract information and the traders' demands for the asset be symmetrically distributed around zero (and later that this variable be jointly normally distributed with the traders' demands), and that the market clears. The results can beextended to most market-making environments, provided symmetry is preserved. The traders' utility functions, their motives to trade and their rationality can be left unexamined. The statistical properties described in the paper hold for any random variable symmetrically (and then jointly normally) distributed with the traders' demands. They hold in a static framework as well as in a dynamic one.
The random variable in question can bethe value of the asset, its price, or in a dynamic model, the price dierence.
After a brief review of the recent empirical literature on the price-volume relation, 1 the major propositions are introduced. It is then shown that the results developed in market-clearing situations can beextended to most market-making frameworks, as long as the price, the asset value and the traders' demands are symmetrically (resp. jointly normally) distributed. Finally, a simple static model is introduced where transaction costs (taxes) can induce a positive c o v ariance between price and volume. Proposition (1) shows that, if a mean-zero random variable is symmetrically distributed with the traders' demands around zero, and the asset market clears, the conditional distribution of this variable conditioned on volume is symmetric, and consequently its conditional expectation based on volume is zero. This result is quite intuitive. For example, as volume is the sum of the buy orders, a high volume indicates a large ow of executed buy orders. But as the market clears, this strong inux of executed buy orders corresponds necessarily to a equally strong ow of executed sell orders.
Proposition (4) shows that, if a mean-zero random variable is jointly normally distributed with 1 the traders' demands and the asset market clears, the covariance between the absolute value of this variable and trading volume is positive, unless this random variable is independent of the traders' demands, in which case the covariance is zero. Taken together, propositions (1) and (4) show that a surge in volume could be associated with a large change in the asset value, without indicating the direction of the change. Proposition (4) is quite general; any dynamic model where the price change is jointly normally distributed with the traders' demands without being independent of them should yield a positive correlation between the absolute value of price change and trading volume. Models of trading volume in a market-clearing setup typically use normally distributed random variables.
For those, propositions (1), and (4) apply, independently of the particular assumptions of each model. Furthermore, numerical examples based on normally distributed demands and asset values indicate that the volume-based conditional distribution of the true asset value has fatter tails than the unconditional distribution when volume is high, and thinner tails when volume is low, a nding that may help ne-tune risk management systems.
Most of the models in the noisy rational expectation literature, either in a market-clearing framework (as in Diamond and Verrechia (1981) ), or in a market making (Kyle type frameworks), as in Wang (1992) , (1994) , Foster and Viswanathan (1994) , He and Wang (1995) , Michaely, Vila and Wang (1996) , use normally distributed random variables. For them, propositions (1) and (4) in the paper hold. Alternatively, Blume et al (1994) construct a model where the precision of the signals observed by the traders are stochastic (hence the signals are not normally distributed).
Simulations based on their model show a positive relation between volume and the absolute value of price change, and a symmetric relation between price change perse and volume (i.e., a large volume is associated with a negative or a positive movement in the asset price). The V-shaped form of the price-volume relation conrms the positive correlation between the magnitude of the price change and trading volume. This seems to indicate that properties similar to those shown in proposition (4) may still be valid for non-normal distributions. Furthermore, the symmetry argument behind proposition (1) also applies to some non-normal distribution, like the elliptically contoured distributions used by F oster and Viswanathan (1993) .
Review of the recent empirical literature
In his extensive review of the literature, Karpo (1987) points out that many empirical studies have found a positive correlation between the absolute value of price change and trading volume.
Furthermore, Karpo reports that price change per se and volume are found to be positively correlated in equity markets but not in futures markets, a pattern he attributes to the existence of short sale constraints in stock and bond markets. Recall that proposition (1), which implies a zero covariance between volume and price change per se, rests on the assumption that the traders' demands are symmetrically distributed. Short sale constraints would introduce asymmetries in the demands and could hence create a positive correlation between price change and volume, despite market clearing. Since 1987, many economists have studied the relation between trading volume and the magnitude of the price change, and between volume and price change per se, on stock data and futures data. These empirical studies tend to conrm Karpo's conclusions. Let's review rst the studies based on stock data, and turn later to studies based on futures.
Using hourly New York Stock Exchange data between 1979 and 1983, Jain and Joh (1988) nd a signicant positive relation between daily trading volume and the absolute value of the Standard & P oor 500 index returns. The relation between volume and returns is stronger for positive returns than for negative returns, and the dierence between the two is statistically signicant. Gallant et al (1992) use daily New York Stock Exchange data between 1928 and 1987 to compute an estimate of the joint density of current price change and volume conditional on past price changes and volume. They nd that \the direction of the daily change in the stock market is unrelated to contemporaneous volume," (p. 223) and that price change are more volatile when volume is heavier.
Before computing the conditional density, they plot price changes against adjusted volumes and point that unusually high volumes are associated with large price changes. Note that Gallant et al, using very long sample and sophisticated econometric methods found no relation between price change perse and trading volume, even though they study an equity market. Using daily Helsinki Stock Exchange data between 1977 , Martikainen et al (1994 is to show that \the greater the ratio of short positions to the numberofshares outstanding, the greater the trading volume associated with price increases relative to that accompanying price decreases." Goodman (1996) uses a random sample of 50 stocks traded on the New York and the American stock exchanges between 1993 and 1994. His ndings conrms that the absolute value of the price change is positively correlated with trading volume, and shows that strong volume is associated with extreme price movements, both positive and negative.
As for futures markets, Karpo uses daily data on futures contracts for 9 commodities and 3 nancial instruments (also called commodities thereafter) between January 1972 to December 1979. Out of the 442 individual contracts (contracts with dierent maturities are traded for each commodity), 353 (80 percent) display a positive relation between the absolute value of the price change and volume; this relation is statistically signicant for 224 contracts (51 percent). About half of the contracts show a positive relation between price change per se and volume; this relation is statistically signicant for only 25 contracts (6 percent). The analysis is repeated on 12 time series (one for each commodity) constructed from the futures contracts data. The relation between the magnitude of the price change and volume is positive for all the commodities, and statistically signicant for 9 of them. None of the commodities shows a signicant relation between price change per se and volume. Foster (1995) Proposition 1 Let y be a n -dimensional vector and u a r andom variable so that (u; y) is symmetrically distributed around zero and n i=1 y i = 0 . L et z = n i =1 y + i , then the conditional distribution of u given z is symmetric around zero , i.e., p(u < t jjz) = p ( u < t jjz), and E[ujjz] = 0 . 
We conclude that E[u z ] = 0, which implies that cov(u; z) = 0 since E[u] = 0 .
In the following, propositions (2) and (3) make it possible to compute the conditional expectation of a random variable conditioned on a sum of truncated random variable. The fact that n i=1 y i = 0 is used in lemmas (1) and (3), and, together with propositions (2) and (3) 
The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 3 Using the same notations as in proposition (2) 
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition (2) can be used to compute the E[xjjz A i ]. Explicit formulas for the p(y 2 A i jjz) are not necessary to prove proposition (1). Later in the paper, studying the conditional distribution of a tail event conditioned on trading volume will call for explicit formulas for the p(y 2 A i jjz), which are given in lemma (4). We will make use of the following lemma
Lemma 1 Let y be a n-dimensional random vector symmetrically distributed a r ound zero, 2 R n , v = 0 y and A a Borel set in R n , then P(y 2 Ajjv)(t) = P ( y 2 A jjv)( 
p(z2(h ;h+)) .
Using market clearing conditions
In 
The proof is in the appendix. Lemma (3) together with propositions (2) and (3) , one concludes that p(u < t jjz) = p ( u < t jjz).
3 Covariance between absolute value of a random variable and trading volume
In the preceding section, one needed only to assume that (u; y) was symmetrically distributed around a zero mean. With the added assumption that (u; y) is normally distributed, one obtains that the covariance between u and z is positive, except only when u and y are independent, in which case cov(juj; z ) = 0 .
Proposition 4 Assume y is a n-dimensional mean zero, normally distributed random vector, 4 Volume-based conditional distribution for normal distributions
Assuming that (u; y) is normally distributed, we can derive formulas for the conditional distribution of u given z, and plot the conditional distribution as a function of the realized volume.
Computing the conditional distribution
Recall that, from equation (6) 
Qualitative characteristics of the conditional distribution
Using the formulas developed in the preceding section, we can plot the conditional distribution of the true asset value x given the volume z for various covariance structures. The upper panel of gure (1) displays the probability in the tail of the volume's distribution, p(z > t), with t on the horizontal axis; the lower panel displays the volume-based conditional probability i n t h e tails of the distribution p(x > 1jjz), with z on the horizontal axis, the dotted line in the lower panel corresponds to the unconditional probability p(x > 1). As x is a standard normal, p(x > 1) is the probability that the true asset value beone standard deviation higher than its mean. Figure   ( 1) has been obtained using with two informed traders and one liquidity trader.
The signals observed by the traders are independent and each has a correlation of :5 with the true value of the stock x. In this case, the mean volume is 0:678 and its standard deviation is 0:3717.
Dierent parameters values were tried without aecting the graph's overall form.
From gure (1), the volume-based conditional probability of`large' realizations of the true asset value is increasing and convex in z. Figure (1) indicates that in sixty eight percent of the time, the conditional probability p(x > 1 jjz) is inferior to the unconditional probability. 2 For the rare, high-volume events, the conditional probability surges rapidly above the unconditional probability.
The volume mean exceeds its median, which reveals that the volume distribution is skewed by large volumes occurring with low probability. To sum, for low and \normal" levels of trading volume, the conditional probability o f x given z is more concentrated around its mean than the unconditional one, whereas for uncommonly high levels of trading volume, the conditional distribution exhibits fat tails.
5 Market-making models
In the following section, propositions (1) and (4) i=1 jy i j = n +1 i=1 y + i = z.
Glosten and Milgrom type models
In Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , a competitive risk-neutral market maker facing better informed traders posts bid and ask prices. The equilibrium bid-ask spread reects the informational asymmetry between the non-informed market maker and the traders. This structure was extended to a monopolistic marker maker by Glosten (1989) . In a comparable framework, introduces quantity limits, which are the maximum amounts the market maker is willing to exchange at the posted prices. In this model, the informed trader, who observes a signal correlated with the true value of the asset, buys (resp. sells) the asset if the quoted ask is below (resp. the bid is above) his valuation. The liquidity trader's demand is price-sensitive and stochastic. The informed trader is assumed to have a negative exponential utility function. Informed and liquidity traders' orders are lumped together and passed on to the specialist, who cannot distinguish informed from liquidity demand. Let a denote the ask price, z a the ask quantity limit, b the bid price, z b the bid quantity (1) applies and E[xjz] = cov(x; z) = cov(p; z) = 0. Table (3) shows the values of p( q<p )and p( q > p ) for dierent p. Naturally, proposition (1) will apply to any market-making model which preserves the symmetry in the transaction price and the traders' demands.
The results of proposition (1), extended to market-making models above, seem to contrast with the models of Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1996) and Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman (1996) , where the specialist uses the order ow to draw inference about the possibility of informed trading.
In their model, the order ow is informative because the specialist takes into account the side on which h e is hit. A large numberofincoming orders on the ask side (resp. the bid side) indicates that the informed trader's valuation is superior to the ask (resp. inferior to the bid). But the volume per se is less informative since it could have been generated by informed traders' sales to the market maker or purchases from him. An outside observer can get more information in a Glosten-Milgrom market-making framework than in a pure market-clearing framework if he can separate sales to the specialist from purchases from him.
5.2 Kyle's type models Kyle (1985) introduces a dynamic model of insider trading with a single risk-neutral informed trader, a noise trader and a competitive risk-neutral market maker. In contrast to the Glosten and Milgrom type models, there is no bid-ask spread and the price at which assets are exchanged is not posted but is determined after the traders submit their market orders. In equilibrium the market maker xes the price to reect the observed order ow, which aggregates the informed trader's and the liquidity demands (this could result from a unmodelled Bertrand game between multiple market makers). Writingṽ the asset's liquidation value, observed only by the informed trader, u the noise trading,x = X(ṽ) the informed trader's demand,x + v the order ow, the pricep is such thatp = P( x+ u ) = E [ṽjx+ u ]. The vector (ṽ;ũ)is normally distributed. Under these conditions, there is a unique linear Nash equilibrium where P and X are linear functions. The framework is applied to dynamic games with linear recursive equilibria, where the dierence in the equilibrium price is a linear function of the dierence in order ow. Kyle's framework, extended to multiple informed traders in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , has been adapted and used by many nancial researchers. In these models, traders' demands, asset value and market prices are jointly normally distributed. The mean demands are zero, and the asset value mean (and hence the price mean) can be normalized to zero. Clearing the market by taking the market maker's net demand into account, propositions (1) and (4) apply. Consequently, with t representing the level or the rst dierence of the price or the value of the asset, E[tjz] = cov(t; z) = 0, cov(jtj; z ) > 0 and p(t > t j z ) is increasing in z (the last result being based on numerical examples).
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) extend Kyle's framework by using distributions of the elliptically contoured class (ECC). Their framework includes multiple informed traders and some publicly available information. As they point out, ECC includes the normal distributions and many other interesting distributions, such as the multivariate t, the mixture of normals, and the multivariate double exponential. The linearity of decisions rules is preserved and the model can investigate the relations between price volatility and trading volume in a richer way. Demands, prices, and the asset value also follow a ECC joint distribution, and hence are symmetrically distributed. As a consequence, proposition (1) applies. Proposition (4) used the properties of the normal distribution and might not extent to all elliptically contoured distributions.
Model with asymmetric demands
The following section presents a simple, static model where the market clears and the covariance between price and volume can bepositive. 4 Some models, like Eps (1975) , rely on behavioral distinctions between dierent types of investors: optimistic traders (or \bulls") systematically ignore unfavorable information, pessimistic traders (or \bears") systematically ignore favorable information. These models deliver the positive volume-price change relation, but at the cost of imposing irrationality on the traders. Karpo (1988) constructs a model where the demand and 4
The relation between price change and volume cannot be investigated in this static model, which should be seen merely as a starting point. supply curves are subject to parallel random shifts. The covariance between price change perse and trading volume has the same sign as the dierence between the variance of the demand shift and the variance of the supply shift. Karpo provides some justication for why costly short sales may result in the variance of the supply shift being smaller than the variance of the demand shift variance. However, one might prefer a more direct way of generating a positive v olume-price change relation than a dierence in the variance of the intercepts of the supply and demand curves.
The covariance between price and trading volume is studied in the model below, which features one noise trader, whose price-inelastic demand is ", and an informed trader, who observes a signal G correlated with the liquidative v alue of the asset x. The vector (x; G; ") is normally distributed, and E[x] = , E[G] = E["] = 0. The informed trader must pay a proportional transaction tax whose rate may vary according to the direction of his trade and the sign of the price. 5 The equilibrium volume j"j is exogenous, and the equilibrium agents' demands (+" for the liquidity trader and " for the informed trader) are symmetrically distributed around their zero means.
However, the covariance between price and trading volume may be dierent from zero because of eect of taxes on the equilibrium price distribution.
The tax rate on purchases is a when the price is positive and d when it is negative; the tax rate on sales is b when the price is positive and c when it is negative. The tax rates a , b , c , and d are between zero and one. In each case, table (4) shows the after-tax prices the informed trader faces as a factor of the pre-tax prices. The informed trader has a negative exponential utility function with risk aversion coecient , and submits a demand schedule as a function of the market clearing price p. Let v = E[xjG] be the informed trader's valuation of the asset, var(xjG) = 1 2 the conditional variance of x given G, where 2 = var(v), and write k = v a r ( x j G ). To simplify computations, we assume that the informed trader considers the market price p as xed although it is random. A rational agent should condition on p as well on G, but as the equilibrium price may not 5 Given the distributional assumptions, the possibility of negative prices has to be considered. This is also the case in many microstructures models. Note that one would be willing to pay to sell the asset if one thinks that the asset price would slide further into the negative range. The informed trader can buy (resp. sell) only if the liquidity demand " is negative (resp. positive). Then, In each case, we study the covariance between price and trading volume when the mean asset value is zero and when it is positive. Except when indicated, the stated results are based on numerical examples and should beconsidered preliminary. When = 0, the covariance between price and trading volume is zero in the rst case 6 , positive in the second, negative if a > b and positive i f a < b in the third. When > 0, the covariance is positive in the rst two cases; in the third, it can be negative if a > b and is positive i f a < b . Note that in the second case, the covariance is always positive, whatever , a and b . In all cases, the covariance between price and trading volume is an increasing function of , so is the price.
When prices are positive, the intuition is immediate. When " is positive, the equilibrium price must besuch that the informed trader is willing to provide liquidity, but he sells at a discount, hence the price has to beeven higher than it would have been in the absence of transaction tax.
When " is negative, the equilibrium price must be such that the informed trader is willing to absorb liquidity, but he buys at a premium, hence the price has to beeven lower than it would have been in the absence of transaction tax. In this case, imposing a cost on purchases creates a 6 This result is derived analytically.
positive c o v ariance even without taxing the informed trader's sales. When prices are negative, the intuition is less obvious, especially as the results depend on whether the tax rate is based on the nature of the informed trader's transaction (sale or purchase) or the sign of the associated cash ow. Increasing the mean value of the asset lowers the probability o f negative market prices and boosts the covariance between price and trading volume.
Conclusion and further research
The paper shows that the volume-based conditional expectation of any mean-zero random variable is zero provided that this random variable and the traders' demands are symmetrically distributed and the asset market clears. Furthermore, when the random variable and the traders' demands are jointly normally distributed, the covariance between the random variable's absolute value and volume is positive, and the tails of the volume-based conditional distribution seem to have fatter tails when volume is high. One of the paper's implications is that the covariance between the absolute value of price change and volume is positive (assuming normal distribution) whereas the covariance between price change perse and volume is zero. The rst implication has veried in many empirical studies. As for the second, empirical studies have found a positive covariance between the price change per se and volume in equity markets but not in futures markets. Karpo (1987) points out that this dierence may be due to a key dierence in the micro-structures of the two t ypes of markets: short sale constraints. Dierent costs in taking long and short positions would introduce asymmetries in the demands, which could explain the positive c o v ariance between price change and volume. A simple, static model was developed where the covariance between price and volume can be positive. Besides, the New York Stock Market (NYSE) is a complex mixed type where each market-maker (or specialist) acts alternatively as dealer and auctioneer.
Moreover, specialists are required to maintain \a fair and orderly market in the securities assigned to them" 7 , a responsibility that includes some form of market stabilization. A market where some 7 NYSE Fact Book 1995, p. 5 agents are responsible for smoothing away short term imbalances may yield a non-zero covariance between volume and price change, even if those agents' trades represent only a small fraction of the activity. 8 Likewise, circuit breakers and other devices certainly aect the relation between price and volume. The results in this paper can be seen as a starting point from which further research taking into account the institutional features of each market can be developed.
8 \The vast majority of NYSE volume is a result of public order meeting public orders" (NYSE Fact Book 1995).
Appendix
Before going in more details, it is useful to present the intuition on which the proves are built.
Recall that for any given (x; y) random vector, E 
The paper basically extends this intuition to E[xjjz], where z is a positive random variable. In the remainder of the paper, call (; F; P ) a probability space, and for any Borel set A and random variable y, write [y 2 A] the set f! 2 ; y ( ! ) 2 A g .
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove (2), we need only show that equations (13) and (14) p(y 2 A) dP (15) The integrand in the right hand side is a constant, and p(y 2 A) = E [ I ( y 2 A ) Proof of lemma 3: The last line of equation (5) Consequently, cov(juj; z ) is non-negative and is zero only if u is independent o f ( y 1 ; y 2 ).
Proof of lemma 4 Take the case i = 1 and let f 1 = f. The other cases can be treated similarly. We know that, for a realization h of the random variable z, p(y 2 A 1 jjz) = lim "!0 p(y 2 A 1 jjz 2 B(h; ")), with B(h; ") being the open ball with center h > 0 and of radius " > 0, with " < h, p(y 2 A 1 jjz 2 B(h; ") ) = p ( y 2 A 1 ;z2B(h;")) p(z2B(h;")) , and p(z 2 B(h; ")) = 6 i=1 p(y 2 A i ; z 2 B ( h; ")).
p(y 2 A 1 ; z 2 B ( h; ")) = p(y 1 > 0; y 2 > 0 ; j y 1 + y 2 h j < " ) = p ( y 1 > 0 ; y 2 > 0 ; h " < y 1 + y 2 < h + " ) = p (0 < y 1 < h "; h " y 1 < y 2 < h + " y 1 )
+ p ( h " < y 1 < h + "; 0 < y 2 < h + " y 1 )
Divide now the numerator and the denominator of p(y 2 A 1 jjz 2 B(h; ") ) b y 2 " , and take the limit when " ! 0. With f being the density function of (y 1 ; y 2 ), we obtain: 1 2" p(0 < y 1 < h "; h " y 1 < y 2 < h + " y 1 ) ! Z h y 1 =0
f(y 1 ; h y 1 ) dy 1 1 2" p(h " < y 1 < h + "; 0 < y 2 < h + " y 1 )
! 0
The rst line of (48) comes from the fact that p(0 < y 1 < h "; h " y 1 < y 2 < h + " y 1 ) = Z h " y 1 =0
Z h+" y 1 y 2 =h " y 1 f(y 1 ; y 2 ) dy 1 dy 2 . For the second line of (48), consider that T able 3: Symmetry of informed trader's demand v is the informed trader's valuation of the asset, is the liquidity shock, the informed trader's demand is v p, h e liquidity trader's demand is p, a is the ask price, b is the bid price. q is the informed trader's demand, z is the maximum quantity the market maker is willing to sell at the ask price a or buy at the bid price b, v is the informed trader's valuation of the asset. Figure 1: Volume-based conditional probability P(x > 1 j z ).
